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This paper takes search intensity for stock tickers in Google (SVI) as a 
direct measure of retail investor attention and assesses whether it holds 
predictive power over short-term market outcomes. In a sample of the most 
representative US stocks, during the period 2005 – 2008, I provide 
evidence that (1) surges of investor attention forecast higher stock liquidity 
and volatility; (2) depending severely on what is considered an abnormal 
level of SVI, retail investor attention can also be priced; and (3) SVI does 
not relate to firm-specific features, such as size and value. Furthermore, I 
extend the investigation to the aggregate market level, finding that investor 
attention to the market index predicts greater market liquidity, volatility 
and return. 






Timing the major stock market outcomes, such as liquidity, volatility and returns 
has been a true challenge to investors and researchers over decades. Yet, a significant 
portion of short-term market phenomena remains unexplained.  
Asset pricing models assume the market is efficient at least at a semi-strong 
level, meaning that all the information is immediately incorporated into security prices, 
after being publicly released. In order for this assumption to hold there is a fundamental 
requirement: investors must pay attention to the assets. 
Information and attention form an interesting couple, the first is useless without 
the second, but an overabundance of information will most likely reduce the attention 
being paid to it. In short and quoting Herbert Simon, “a wealth of information creates a 
poverty of attention”. 
People’s attention can be seen as a resource, and as any other resource in an 
economic environment, attention is also scarce. Hence, there is the need to be 
effectively attentive to the information available, which is mostly released in the form of 
news. What is more is that attention is time-varying, and following Andrei and Hasler 
(2012), investors’ attention oscillates in accordance with the state of economy. Hence, 
attention fluctuations are usually between two extremes: either investors are very 
attentive to the financial and economic press, something that occurs mainly during 
downturns; or they almost disregard news, which is typically verified in a bullish phase.  
 After establishing some of investors’ attention’s features, such as being a limited 
resource whose usage varies over time, it is pertinent to bring back the asset pricing 
models into play, such as CAPM (1961-1966), Fama-French (1993) or Carhart (1994). 
These three key tools that aim at forecasting stock returns only look at market and firm-
specific components, leaving out of consideration issues related to investors’ 
psychological behaviour. Naturally, this last element is particularly hard to measure, 
however recent studies carried out by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011); Joseph, Wintoki 
and Zhang (2011) among others, present a timely effective measure of investors’ 
attention, resorting to search frequency for companies’ ticker symbols in Google, the 
search engine leading by far the landscape of internet search, possessing, in July 2013, a 
67% share of all the searches executed by web users worldwide
1
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  Since 2004, Google has been storing on its database the volume of searches for a 
certain word, expression or symbol, and making it available to public on a weekly basis, 
through a website called Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends/). 
 A relevant link between investors’ psychological behaviour, hereby translated by 
intensity of online searches, and market movements is of major importance, especially, 
if data collected on web platforms turns out to hold some predictive power. 
 To corroborate this idea and show its usefulness Choi and Varian (2009) argued 
that “harnessing the collective intelligence of millions of users, Google web search logs 
can provide one of the most timely, broad-reaching influenza monitoring systems 
available today”, in other words, this data that allegedly mirrors “what we collectively 
think” represents an important piece of information about “what might happen in the 
future” (Rangaswamy, Giles and Seres, 2009, p.58). 
 In fact, when people search for something somewhere, they are explicitly being 
attentive to it, which makes a query for a stock in Google, or in any other search engine, 
an unequivocal manifestation of attention. 
As it is, to test whether the Search Volume Index (SVI) for tickers, as a direct 
measure of investor attention, indeed holds predictive power over stock market activity 
I use a sample of stocks included in the S&P 500 over the period 2005-2008, and SVI 
impact is in the first place assessed on liquidity. As a matter of fact, I find that rises in 
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levels of investor attention verified in a certain week predict a higher share turnover 
ratio in the following week. Provided that investor attention has a significant impact on 
liquidity, I assess its relation with stock returns volatility, expecting it to be positive. 
Consistently, I encounter an also dynamic relationship between investor attention and 
volatility of returns, with a surge in the former leading to an increase in the latter. 
Moving forward in the analysis, I evaluate if SVI also encloses some price 
impact. I disclose that only abnormal levels of attention registered during the present 
week are capable of predicting higher returns in the subsequent week, being consistent 
with the attention-induced price pressure theory of Barber and Odean (2008). However, 
this result does not appear to be as strong as other papers present it, with the statistically 
significance of this interaction being substantially affected by the measure of abnormal 
SVI employed. 
 After acknowledging the main effects of investor attention a question of major 
relevance is worth raising. What type of investors own the attention being captured by 
ticker searches in Google? The answer – individual/less sophisticated investors – can be 
found only by following intuition. Logically, institutional investors benefit from an easy 
access to specific platforms providing extensive financial information as well as vast 
databases, such as Bloomberg and Reuters, which makes them unlikely users of Google 
for ticker searching. In contrast, retail investors, lacking those professional tools, resort 
to Google or other universal search engines to seek financial information. Da et al. 
(2011) deliver the formal proof for this fact.   
 Once it is established that retail investors’ attention is in charge, I look at what 
type of stocks they search in Google, with the objective of going a step further and 
substantiating some well-known anomalies with a possible explanation coming from 
investor attention. I put in place a naïve approach and a formal econometric analysis. 
Both yield the same results: size anomaly, value anomaly and momentum anomaly do 
not relate to retail investor attention. In addition, firm-specific characteristics, such as 
market capitalisation and Book-to-Market ratio do not establish any relevant connection 
with SVI. In this part of the study, I only provide some evidence for a price reversal 
after the positive returns earned when investors are quite attentive.  
 The final exercise revisits the above mentioned market outcomes, from an 
aggregate market perspective, reaching the surprising conclusions that the search 
volume for the term S&P500 has explanatory power over market liquidity, volatility of 
returns and fluctuations of the index quote. 
 Besides contributing as a robustness test to the results documented by similar 
studies, using a sample of the most salient and economic meaningful US stocks, and the 
most appropriate method for each analysis, according to Petersen (2005), this paper 
originally approaches the theme of anomalies, finding no relevant results, and 
successfully extends the findings found for individual stocks to the overall market. 
Throughout this investigation of investor attention, noise trading theories were 
corroborated. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the relevant 
literature on this topic. Section III describes the specificities of the data used. Section IV 
summarises the tested hypotheses as well as the methodology followed. Section V 
presents and thoroughly discusses the empirical findings. Section VI concludes 
reinforcing the importance of the behavioural component in the financial markets 
universe. 
II. Literature Review 
 Primarily, this paper establishes a link with the finance literature that approaches 
investors’ psychological behaviours, particularly attention and sentiment. In the 
background, it relates to studies that deal with the implications of noise trading on the 
market. The two previous phenomena are intimately related.  
 Shleifer and Summers (1990) extensively study the noise trading issue, 
suggesting that retail investors, who are often less informed, tend to trade impulsively, 
basing their investments on noisy signals which they perceive as good opportunities to 
participate in the stock market. The aggregation of those signals generates sentiment. In 
the same market, wise and informed investors who ponder risk – arbitrageurs – co-exist. 
Their role is to explore securities’ mispricing, driving their price close to fundamentals. 
Yet, some misalignment between stock price and company’s intrinsic value tend to 
subsist, indicating that noise traders not only influence the market, but also sometimes 
do it so intensely that they limit the action of risk-averse arbitrageurs. The reason why 
this is possible as well as its proof is provided by Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009a), who 
investigate sets of retail brokerage data and report high correlations between trades from 
individual investors, from which persistent psychological biases are identified. As a 
consequence, noise traders may or not be responsible for some well-known anomalies 
that have been alive over years, but, through investor sentiment, they are very likely in 
charge of temporary market events, such as extreme trading volumes, volatility shocks 
and significant security mispricing, as shown by Barber et al. (2009b).  
 Going back to the genesis of sentiment, to spot the signals, investors must have 
paid attention to financial assets.      
The first research on investors’ cognitive sphere was done by Merton (1987), 
who posits that each investor knows only a finite set of stocks, leading to a non-
diversified portfolio. In his model equilibrium, stocks which have low visibility and 
thus are more neglected by investors achieve higher returns. For the stocks that are often 
on the investor’s spotlight, Barber et al. (2008) theorise an attention-induced price 
pressure, supporting that retail investors in the presence of attention-grabbing events 
typically become net buyers, and provided that the supply of stocks is inelastic (at least 
in the short-run), an upwards price pressure is verified, leading to positive returns. They 
back-up this hypothesis with evidence from three attention-grabbing events: extreme 
trading volume, abnormal returns and news coverage. 
 Besides the above three, other proxies of investor attention exist, however all of 
them are indirect, since they rely on the assumption that when these events took place 
investors paid attention to them, a statement that does not always hold. In these 
circumstances, Da et al. (2011) propose a direct measure of investor attention, Search 
Volume Index (SVI) in Google for stock tickers, which not only reveals attention but 
also allows gauging its level. 
 Furthermore, to avoid the risk of using a variable that is intended to have a true 
and unique explanatory power over stock returns, but is no more than a proxy for other 
external events, such as news coverage, Da et al. (2011) demonstrate in their exercise 
that 95% of the variation in web search queries, occurs independently from the amount 
and type of economic and financial news, which are sporadic while SVI is continuous. 
 Da et al. (2011) depart from the work of Barber et al. (2008) and assert that SVI 
points out a buy decision for the asset being searched, as when investors intend to 
purchase a stock, they can choose from an immense universe of stocks, so they pick 
from the ones which called their attention, whereas when they consider selling a stock, 
they usually have available only the stocks they own, on which they should already 
possess a considerable amount of knowledge.  
Da et al. (2011) proceed to the clarification of whose attention is coming into 
play with Google searches for tickers. In order to demonstrate that retail investors are 
the ones responsible for this sort of online search, they analyse a vast set of data for 
orders and trades across different market centres. Using Madoff as a representative 
centre for individual investors and NYSE as a typical centre for institutional investors, 
they reach the conclusion that abnormal levels of SVI consistently have a great impact 
on the first, while the second remains unaffected, confirming what intuition suggests: 
retail investors, less sophisticated and unlikely current users of professional finance 
platforms are the ones who utilise Google to acquire financial information about stocks. 
 Finally, using the sample of Russel 3000 stocks, they corroborate Barber et al. 
(2008) attention-induced price pressure, and also Barber et al. (2009) price reversal as a 
second consequence of noise trading. In this last case, Da et al. (2011) document that 
returns revert in approximately the same magnitude, within a year horizon. 
 In the same field, Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang (2011) triangulate these results 
within the S&P 500 sample, adding evidence for positive dynamic correlation between 
search intensity and trading volume. Taking a step forward they reach the striking result 
that SENT (their name for the SVI variable) is positively correlated with the market risk 
factor (Rm-Rf), following they find out that SENT correlations with Value (HML) and 
Momentum (UMD) are similar to the ones verified between these two variables and the 
market factor, which leads them to the conclusion that SENT can potentially mimic the 
market risk factor. Furthermore, when applying the Carhart model with the extra 
variable for search intensity to the empirical data, Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang (2011) 
realise that after controlling for all the four factors, SENT still possesses incremental 
information, suggesting that asset pricing models should take under consideration 
investors’ behaviour variables in an attempt to forecast stock returns. 
 Finally, Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) evaluate the impact of attention paid to 
the 30 largest NASDAQ companies’ names on the respective stock returns’ volatility. 
Vlastakis et al. (2012) account for both, information demand and information supply, by 
using SVI and news. They find a high correlation between SVI and historical volatility 
and a lower, still statistically significant, relation with idiosyncratic implied volatility.  
 Dimpfl and Jank (2012) carry out a different analysis on the grounds of volatility 
and they find a strong co-movement of Dow Jones index volatility and retail investor 
attention, measured by SVI. Reporting Granger causality between the two realities, 
Dimpfl and Jank (2012) identify the following pattern: “a fundamental shock in 
volatility triggers noise trading, which, in turn, leads to more volatility.” 
III. Data 
 To quantify the main variable of interest of this study – investor attention – I use 
the Search Volume Index in Google for the stocks included in the main US stock index, 
the S&P 500. Concretely, this dataset is the one from the paper “Investor Information 
Demand: Evidence from Google Searches around Earnings Announcements” (2012), 
which is freely provided by its authors Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock
2
. 
Originally, these data have daily frequency and cover the period under analysis, 
ranging from the 1
st
 of January 2005 to the 31
st
 of December 2008. As this dissertation 
targets the disclosure of more comprehensive relations between aggregate queries for 
stocks on a universal search engine and broad market outcomes, there was a need to 
convert the data frequency to weekly. That was rigorously executed on Excel, resorting 
to pivot tables, which allow the conversion of daily data into weekly data, by taking its 
sum. 
Furthermore, Drake et al. (2012) downloaded this data using the fixed scaling 
option, a feature that scales each SVI value according to a specific observation, the first 
one. This feature does not harm the interpretation of regression coefficients, 
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Google Trends since nowadays Google only provides data normalised and scaled to the sample average, disabling comparisons 
among different stocks. 
particularly, if they are in a logarithmical form the interpretation is done as usual, 
considering a 1% increase in the explanatory variable.  
 The companies’ stocks were identified in Google through their ticker symbols, 
rather than companies’ names or even companies’ most famous products or services. 
The reasoning behind this choice relates to the fact that the relevant searches for the 
sake of this analysis are the ones that aim at investment purposes. Therefore, it was 
assumed that people would search for a stock ticker symbol in order to collect relevant 
financial information, which is quite useful when a limited amount of money can be 
allocated to a wide variety of stocks, diverging a lot in performance and fundamentals. 
Trying to capture investors’ attention by looking at search data on companies’ names or 
most famous products would turn out to be inaccurate, not only because a company may 
be known by more than one name or because those names may have other meanings 
(Ex: Apple, Amazon) but also because people may search them on Google, the 
worldwide search engine leader, for various reasons other than investing. Hence, 
tickers, uniquely assigned symbols were chosen as the best signal of investor’s 
attention, raising no ambiguities, except for the tickers that may have other meanings or 
even be confused with other acronyms, (Ex: AA, ABC, ZION, COST). Companies with 
this sort of noisy tickers or companies for which the stock ticker coincides with the 
name of the company itself (Ex: IBM) were eliminated from the sample, being 
consistent with the aim of capturing only the attention of potential investors. 
 Google Trends data for stock tickers knows some upfront limitations. (1) Due to 
its nature it is likely to contain some noise; as described above and also by the 
application of a final filter, all the efforts to minimise its impact were done. (2) It may 
also have some degree of seasonality, in the aftermath of specific company events or 
correlate with news. Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the analyses’ rigour, as 
already explained, Da et al. (2011) prove that “SVI indeed captures investor attention 
and is different from existing proxies of attention”. 
 Finally, as one of the goals of this paper is to provide a robustness test to 
previous studies, the variable accounting for abnormal levels of investor attention was 
constructed in multiple ways
3
. 
 Regarding the sample of stocks, in order to avoid survivorship bias, before 
applying filters, it comprises all the stocks that were ever included in the S&P 500, 
during the time span under analysis. As a matter of fact, there was a need to 
acknowledge the historical constituents of the referred index, information that was 
possible to access through Wharton Research Data Services website
4
.  
 After possessing all the company tickers, firm-specific characteristics and 
market data for individual stocks, the market index and the VIX index were retrieved 
from a Bloomberg terminal and Yahoo! Finance. Data on macroeconomic indicators 
was obtained from Trading Economics website
5
. Weekly Fama-French factors were 
obtained from Fama and French data library
6
. For the analysis at the aggregate market 
level, SVI for the term S&P500 was downloaded directly from Google Trends. 
After all the previously mentioned necessary adjustments to guarantee the 
validity of the analyses, the two datasets (SVI and Market data) were merged and a final 
filter was applied: all the stocks that did not have both, a valid SVI (different from zero 
for more than 70% of the observations) and valid market data (complete time-series of 
return and trading volume), were excluded. Once this narrowing down process, which 
                                                            
3 Abnormal SVI is the difference between the log-SVI of each observation and: the log-median over the past 4 weeks; the log-
median over the past 6 weeks; the log-median over the past 8; the log-median of the whole sample. Abnormal SVI was also 
computed in the same way, but using log-averages instead of log-medians. Finally, for the returns analysis I also tried out variations 
in SVI. When nothing is specified, the Abnormal SVI variable being used corresponds to logSVIt- logmedian(SVIt-1,…SVIt-4)).  
4 https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
5 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
5 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
 
manually goes through each individual stock, was completed, I attained the final 
sample, which is composed by 215 stocks. 
 As the stocks included in the S&P 500 are mostly liquid, there was no reason to 
worry about bid-ask bounce problems derailing the analysis of returns. 
 A final remark concerning winsorization of the variables ought to be made. 
Winsorizing the variables is a double-edged sword in this case. On the one hand, 
decreases or cancels the impact of extreme observations, potentiating a higher 
correlation between different realities. On the other hand, it forces the loss of a 
relationship of utmost interest, the relationship between abnormal values of SVI and 
abnormal values of return or volume. Thus, I decided not to winsorize the variables. 
IV. Hypotheses development and Methodology 
Building upon the work of Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009), which 
comprehensively investigates the impact of noise trading on asset pricing, and Barber 
and Odean (2008), which aims at explaining the triggers of noise trading, by studying 
attention-grabbing events, I develop a robustness test to the results posteriorly found in 
the related literature about retail investors’ attention, as measured by the intensity of 
web searches for stock tickers in the worldwide leader search engine Google. 
In that sense, in order to evaluate whether Google SVI possesses predictive 
power over main stock market outcomes, such as liquidity, volatility and returns, the 
following hypotheses are tested: 
H1: Seasholes and Wu (2007) document that several events to which retail 
investors pay attention lead to more active trading, usually with individual investors 
becoming net buyers. Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang (2012) find that surges in the volume 
of search queries for stock tickers precedes an increase in trading volume over the 
following week. In this paper, I test this effect of retail investor attention on stocks’ 
liquidity, using share turnover ratio, from a dynamic and contemporaneous perspective, 
assessing the impact of previous week SVI and current week SVI, respectively, on the 
current week share turnover ratio. 
H2: Vlastakis and Marlellos (2012) present strong evidence that information 
demand, using web searches for companies’ name, helps explaining contemporaneous 
stock returns volatility, both historical and implied. On the same field, Dimpfl and Jank 
(2012) report Granger causality between web search queries for tickers and realised 
volatility. I evaluate whether unequivocal declarations of attention to individual stocks 
throughout the current and previous weeks predict changes in volatility, using a sample 
of S&P 500 firms.  
H3: Da, Engleberg and Gao (2011) support that a rise in individual investor 
attention forecasts a significant price impact, generating short-term positive abnormal 
returns in the subsequent week. I test if this result holds in a lagged relationship and if it 
is also present within the current week. First, if SVI for individual stocks has a truly 
significant effect on stock returns, and if so, in which direction, constituting a 
robustness test not only to Da et al. (2011), Joseph et al. (2012), but also to the 
attention-induced price pressure of Barber and Odean (2008).   
H4: If the results presented by Da et al. (2011) turn out to be corroborated by the 
empirical data, in an attempt to go a step further, I investigate whether retail investors’ 
attention may be related to some well-known anomalies, such as the Size anomaly, the 
Value anomaly and the Momentum anomaly.  
H5: To finalise, I examine if the impact of SVI on individual stocks liquidity, 
volatility and returns is extended to the stock market at an aggregate level, gauging 
whether the search volume for the term S&P500 produces changes in the 
aforementioned market outcomes for the market index itself.  
To conduct these analyses, whenever pertinent, I start by tabulating the data with 
the goal of providing a first insight to stock features and sample descriptive statistics.  A 
formal econometrical analysis follows. To rigorously study the impacts of investors’ 
attention on stocks, I resort to panel regressions with fixed-effects, an extension of the 
classical linear model, which enables obtaining unbiased estimators, by controlling for 
unobservable confounding factors that vary across units (stocks) but are constant over 
time, for instance industry or firm-specific effects. To ensure the validity of inference, 
the standard errors computed are robust to heteroskedasticity (White standard errors) 
and also clustered by units, accounting for a possible presence of correlation in the 
residuals within each firm. I also use Fama-Macbeth panel regressions
7
, whose standard 
errors address the time possible time correlation in the residuals.  
A remark concerning the decision rule for the usage of the above mentioned 
regressions ought to be made. When a firm-effect is present, fixed-effects panel 
regressions with robust clustered standard errors are implemented. Conversely, when a 
time-effect is encountered, Fama-Macbeth is the correct choice.
8
  
Finally, to predict the variance of returns, whenever possible, GARCH (1,1) 
model – the standard tool to estimate stock returns volatility, introduced by Bollerslev 
(1986) –  is used. Briefly, the GARCH (1,1) maximum-likelihood (or quasi-maximum 
likelihood) estimation suggests that the best forecast for the variance of stock returns is 
a weighted average of the most recent variance registered and the information contained 
in the most recent squared residual.  
 
                                                            
7 Created by Fama and Macbeth (1973), this econometrical method, for panel data, determines the risk-premium of each risk factor 
in a two-step procedure: first, it carries out time-series regressions, regressing the returns of each stock against the proposed risk 
factor determining the Beta’s of each asset in relation to that risk factor; second, it runs cross-sectional regressions having the 
returns of each stock as dependent variable and the previously calculated Beta’s as the independent ones, to finally get the risk-
premium for each risk-factor, originally called Gamma by Fama and Macbeth (1973). 
8 Petersen (2005) provides a useful discussion as it comes to which model is the most appropriate to be used in different contexts. 
Moreover, Petersen (2005) also clarifies that the identification of the form of dependence present in the data is made by a 
comparison between White standard errors and the standard errors yield by each model. If SE clustered by group are much larger 
than White SE, there is a firm-effect. If SE from Fama-Macbeth are much larger than White SE, time-effect is present. 
V. Empirical Findings 
V.1 Data Framing – Stock features and descriptive statistics 
 In this first subsection, I provide a broad overview of the general characteristics 
and descriptive statistics of the 215 S&P500 stocks included in the sample. In order to 
do so, the sample was sorted by date, and within this first arrangement, quintiles were 
formed in accordance to the attention level paid to the individual stocks (Table 1). 
 Table 2 contains the statistics for both market events and firm-specific features 
for the five weekly portfolios formed on the basis of SVI
9
.  
 Starting off with liquidity, it is clearly visible that the portfolio registering the 
top levels of investors’ attention comprises the mostly traded stocks. H1 seems to be 
corroborated by this simple first approach, as even though for the other quintiles volume 
and turnover fluctuate around the same values, it is possible to notice a rising tendency 
as we move from lower to upper quintiles, suggesting a positive interaction between 
investors’ attention and liquidity. 
 Along with increased liquidity, it is likely to come more volatility. In fact, this 
preliminary approach to the data suggests that. Similarly to liquidity, significantly 
greater volatility registered over the past 30 days is observable on the portfolio 
receiving the highest investor attention, whereas in the remaining quintiles a smooth 
upward trend can be identified, which may be related to retail investor attention. 
 Moving to stock returns, the existence of a pattern is not as obvious as before, 
yet there seems to be a rising tendency as we move from the lowest to the highest SVI 
quintiles. However, by looking at the portfolio receiving the largest attention, a sudden 
break in the tendency is detected, as returns drop sharply compared to the previous 
portfolio. Basically, this fact points out that the most searched stocks were the ones 
                                                            
9 Table 1 provides both statistics, median and mean. The preliminary conclusions drawn are valid regardless the measure chosen, as 
they display essentially the same patterns.  
performing worst, something that, at first sight,  appears to contradict the positive 
correlation between abnormal levels of SVI and abnormal levels of returns documented 
by Da et al. (2011) and by Joseph et al. (2012).  
Even so, it is interesting to perceive that the 4
th
 quartile encloses the best 
performers and that, when the impact of outliers is mitigated, there appears to be a 
positive correlation between SVI and investors’ attention up to the 4
th
 quartile, 
including, which also disputes one main finding from Merton (1987), who supports that 
stocks enjoying low visibility usually perform slightly better than more visible peers.   
Naturally, no rigorous conclusion can be drawn at this stage, however the 
empirical data may suggest that stocks benefit from visibility up to some point, after 
which too much attention leads to abnormal trading and, in turn, abnormal trading leads 
to volatility spikes, which can jeopardise returns. The addition of a higher risk likely 
prompts a sell-off decision for an average individual investor, risk-averse by nature, 
generating price falls. It is worth to stress that this simply theorised, and not yet 
formally proven, relation of retail investor attention, volatility and return, does not 
concern systematic volatility but instead some source of idiosyncratic volatility, as 
documented by Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006). In the present situation, this 
idiosyncratic volatility may be generated by a too large level of individual investors’ 
attention, which ends up penalising stock ownership by reducing stock returns.  
After getting a preliminary flavour of what general effects investor attention may 
have on market outcomes, and before focusing on the individual econometrical analysis 
of each one, I deepen the analysis on firm-specific characteristics as well as past returns 
to see if it is possible to establish a potential relation between retail investor attention 
and some well-known anomalies, such as size, value and momentum.  
Table 2 indicates that, roughly speaking, the larger companies are, the more 
attention is paid to them. As for the Book-to-Market ratio, it is possible to observe that 
on the two extreme quintiles, the one with the lowest SVI and the one with the highest 
SVI, we find the most overvalued stocks, i.e. the stocks with the lowest BTM. This 
overvaluation can be a possible explanation for the most negative returns earned by 
these two portfolios. Taking the two together, it is possible to extrapolate a possible link 
with retail investor attention. This data points out that the lowest attention-grabbing 
firms are the smallest ones, while the mostly searched stocks are the largest. In this 
scenario, a potential behavioural bias of individual investors can be considered: 
investors pay greater attention to big capitalisation stocks, as they are more often 
mentioned in the press and noticing a considerable overvaluation, they tend to get rid of 
them, generating the negative returns. On the other side, retail investors are not that 
attentive to smaller firms. Especially, if they appear to be extremely overvalued 
compared to other public firms, hardly they will consider a purchase. The higher P/E 
ratio figures for these two quintiles corroborate the noticeable overvaluation. 
By looking at the average past return earned in each portfolio, it is visible that 
the lowest past returns are registered on the highest SVI quintile, which may suggest 
that retail investors’ common behaviour may lead to the persistency of negative returns, 
through the following mechanism: in the first place investors’ attention is caught by 
extreme negative returns, as such they search them on Google, verifying their 
overvaluation and bad performance, preceding a sell-off decision that contributes to 
intensify the negativity of returns.  
In sum, even though, through this simple approach, firm-specific characteristics 
appear to be related retail investor attention, there is no preliminary evidence for any 
kind of link between SVI and well-known market anomalies. 
It is important to reinforce that all the hypotheses described in this subsection 
have no rigorous proof. They are exclusively grounded on the interpretation of 
descriptive tables using finance intuition. Throughout the next subsections, a thorough 
formal analysis will be conducted. 
 
V.2 The effect of retail investor attention on stock’s liquidity 
 In this subsection, I examine the potential link between the intensity of search 
queries on Google for stock tickers and stocks’ liquidity by carrying out a set of 
analyses using panel regressions with fixed effects, and computing robust standard 
errors clustered by firm.  
 Before describing the procedure followed, it is relevant to establish the 
distinction between trading volume and share turnover ratio, which made me opt for the 
latter to conduct this investigation. In their essence, both are liquidity measures. 
However, while trading volume is a raw liquidity metric which simply counts the 
amount of shares of stock that were bought and sold over a certain time span; share 
turnover compares that same volume traded to the total number of shares outstanding 
during the same time period through a ratio. Its use, as opposed to trading volume, 
enables a more accurate interpretation of stock’s liquidity, particularly when there is a 
large difference between the number of shares outstanding across different companies. 
 As a matter of fact, and since the results obtained were pretty much the same for 
both liquidity measures, the focus of this analysis will be on turnover, whose results are 
shown in Table 3.  
 To test whether volume of searches in Google correlates with stock turnover, the 
starting point was to set up a model that aims at explaining turnover through the usual 
explanatory variables, such as contemporaneous stock price, market capitalisation and 
past returns up to the fourth lag. Naturally, transaction costs, such as brokerage 
commissions, would be a relevant variable to account for, however as the stocks in the 
sample are stocks from the S&P 500, they should all be liquid enough to consider the 
bid-ask spread negligible; and brokerage fees are impossible to control as there is no 
data reporting which broker made the deal. 
All control variables turned out to be significant except for contemporaneous 
stock price, possibly because it corresponds only to the closing stock price of the week, 
and the R
2 
of this model was 10.7%. Following, the contemporaneous SVI in 
logarithmical form was introduced as explanatory variable and its impact on turnover 
appears to be positive and statistically significant at 1%, presenting the first piece of 
evidence for the existence of a true interaction between investors’ attention and stocks 
liquidity. In order to account for non-linearity in this relationship, a quadratic term – 
logarithmical SVI squared – was added to the equation. Apparently, the solely linear 
relation between SVI and turnover was overestimating the effect of the former on the 
latter, a fact demonstrated by the negative coefficient associated with the non-linear SVI 
term, which is statistically significant at 1%.  
 Finally, Joseph et al. (2011) document a slightly different relationship between 
search volume and stock liquidity, measured by trading volume. In their study, they find 
a dynamic interaction, through which abnormal SVI levels registered in a certain week 
predict a higher trading volume in the following week. Motivated by their findings, two 
lagged variables of SVI, both linear and quadratic, were included in the equation: 
                 ∑                                              
              
          (1)
 The above specification, whose results are in Column (6) of Table 3, has an 
adjusted R
2 
of 13.6% and it no longer provides strong evidence for the existence of a 
contemporaneous relationship
10
. Instead, it supports that the interaction between retail 
investor attention and liquidity is dynamic corroborating what was found by Joseph et 
al. (2012). Furthermore, it is also non-linear and as such the impact of SVI on turnover 
can be interpreted as follows: SVI indeed leads an increase in turnover, however its 
impact is decreasing in magnitude. Numerically, ceteris paribus, on average, a 1% 
increase in SVI registered during the current week forecasts a 0.01532% rise in share 
turnover ratio during the following week.  
 Once the relationship between retail investor attention levels and liquidity, 
measured through turnover was established, it is relevant to assess a more specific 
connection between abnormal levels of attention and abnormal turnover, the only one 
reported by Joseph et al (2011). The determination of abnormal turnover requires 
abnormal trading volume, which was computed as in Joseph et al. (2012): the difference 
between the trading volume of each week and the average weekly volume over the 
whole sample period. Then, to calculate the abnormal share turnover ratio, it suffices to 
divide abnormal trading volume by the total amount of shares outstanding. The main 
variable of interest, abnormal SVI, is computed as described in the data section.  
 The methodology followed to investigate the existence of an interaction between 
abnormal SVI and abnormal turnover was the same as before. Firstly, I implemented a 
model to explain abnormal turnover with the usual control variables and an additional 
one, BTM, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the Book-to-market ratio is 
equal or below 0.35, a threshold arbitrarily established in accordance with the 
descriptive statistics presented in the previous subsection; and 0 otherwise. The 
rationale behind this binary variable is that when the Book-to-Market ratio drops to 
values that indicate an exaggerated overvaluation, investors are affected by an irrational 
                                                            
10 Only the non-linear term remained significant, however only at a 10% level. Hence, I considered its impact negligible. However, 
the two contemporaneous variables were not suppressed from the model, because their inclusion seems relevant as the goodness of 
fit metric points out and also because removing the linear and keeping the quadratic alone does not make much sense. So, in this 
case, keeping the variables does not constitute a violation of the Principle of Parsimony. 
behavioural bias, called disposition effect, extensively explained by Barberis and Xiong 
(2009), prompting the sale of winners and the holding of losers, related to the fact that 
investors prefer to recognise gains too early than to realise losses. In this case, I assume 
that the disposition effect leads to an abnormal trading volume. The coefficient 
associated to this variable is positive as expected and is statistically significant at 1%. 
Once this model was set up, abnormal SVI variables were added to the equation 
similarly to what was done before. At a first stage, only the linear and contemporaneous 
abnormal SVI but then the non-linear term as well. Likewise the previous analysis, both 
turned out to be statistical significant. The results are available in Table 4. 
 Being consistent with the earlier finding about a lagged interaction between 
investors’ attention and turnover, the 1-week lag of the abnormal SVI was introduced in 
the regression, yielding the final model:  
                 ∑                                              
              
         (2)  
Just as before, this model, whose goodness of fit equals 17.4%, suggests a strong 
dynamic relationship between abnormal SVI levels and abnormal turnover
11
, and no 
significant contemporaneous relationship. Specifically, a 1% increase in current week 
abnormal SVI predicts an average rise of 0.0257% in abnormal turnover during the 
subsequent week. 
  All in all, conversely to what was initially found in the first step of the analyses, 
only in a dynamic relationship, retail investor attention, on both normal and extreme 
levels, captured via volume of searches in Google for stock tickers exercises 
explanatory power over stock’s normal and abnormal liquidity, hereby measured by 
share turnover ratio and abnormal share turnover ratio, respectively. The bottom line 
conclusion is that when individual investors search stocks intensely on Google, they are 
                                                            
11 The results obtained for the interaction between abnormal levels of retail investor attention and abnormal turnover are robust 
across all different constructions of the abnormal SVI variable, described in the data section. 
considering an investment decision which, in some cases, will indeed occur in the 
following week, affecting liquidity expressively. These results are in line with the work 
of Barber et al. (2009), Barber and Odean (2008) and Seasholes and Wu (2007) as it 
comes to a significant interaction between individual investors’ attention and trading 
volume. They also triangulate the findings of Joseph et al. (2012), using a more accurate 
measure of liquidity and resorting to the most appropriate model, fixed-effects with 
robust clustered standard errors. Furthermore, I show that not only abnormal levels of 
attention interact with stock liquidity, but also normal levels, i.e. the weekly amount of 
Google searches per se. Still, the impact of the former is greater than the impact of the 
latter. 
 
V.3 Retail investor attention and historical volatility of stock returns 
 In the previous subsection, I formally demonstrated that retail investor attention 
has a true impact stock liquidity. As previously argued, retail investors, who tend to be 
less informed and less sophisticated, in general underlie their investments decisions on 
an emotional component, prompted by noisy signals, which they perceive as good 
opportunities, rather than on a rational exercise weighing risk and firm fundamentals 
(see Shleifer and Summers (1990)). Therefore, as noise traders, retail investors can 
affect not only the value of individual securities they trade, but also the whole market 
(see Barber at al.(2009), Peng and Xiong (2006)). One of the common effects of noise 
trading corresponds to an increase in stock returns volatility, as posited by Dimpfl and 
Jank (2012). In line with this, and provided that liquidity also increases with peaks of 
investor attention, I investigate its impact on the historical volatility of stocks being 
searched in Google as well as the validity of noise trading theories within this data. 
 In order to do so, I started by implementing a GARCH (1,1) model, which aimed 
at explaining volatility using the two usual variables (past variance and past squared 
residual) as well as an exogenous variable: retail investor attention – SVI. Unluckily, 
this model yielded a non-stationary process for the variance, meaning that I am facing 
an explosive GARCH (α+β > 1) from which nothing can be validly concluded, 
according to Francq and Zakoian (2008). Table 5 contains the model results.
12
  
 Therefore, I was forced to use a sub-optimal model to approach the estimation of 
volatility. I chose the panel regression with fixed-effects and robust clustered standard 
errors. This model is very likely to contain measurement error, so I recognise it as a 
limitation of this analysis, however as shown by Islam et al. (2012), who compare 
various volatility estimates from several models, reaching the conclusion that statistical 
significance of the coefficients as well as their direction tend to remain unchanged 
across most of them, including OLS and GARCH. 
 Nevertheless, care must be taken when linearly estimating volatility. Past 
volatility cannot be included in the sample, however a proxy for it can. Hence, as a 
control variable, I include in the model 1-week lagged VIX return. From a wide variety 
of factors, ranging from geopolitical and systemic issues to market and firm-specific 
events, which are said to affect volatility of returns; I picked macroeconomic aspects 
(monthly industrial production growth), interest rates (weekly return of the risk-free 
asset), market outcomes for each firm (volume traded and past return), firm-specific 
events (a Bloomberg estimate for 1-year dividend growth), to use as other control 
variables. The dependent variable is volatility over the last 30 days and the results are 
available in Table 6. 
                                                            
12 Two reasons may explain the explosive GARCH (1,1). The first is that the variance process itself is non-stationary and the second 
is that the variables input in the model are non-stationary themselves. If the second turned out to be true most of the inference done 
so far would be invalid. Hence, to be as much diligent as possible, I submitted stock returns and SVI to a unit-root Augmented 
Dickey Fuller Test with 10 lags. These two tests did reject the null hypothesis of unit-root. (Returns are believed to be stationary, 
however when great shocks occur, they may become non-stationary and as the sample comprises the beginning of the financial 
crisis, it is pertinent to test their stationarity.) Auxiliary Tables 5.1 and 5.2 contain the results of the ADF test. 
 Keeping consistency with what was done before, the first step of the procedure 
consisted in setting up a model to explain volatility, containing the aforementioned 
control variables. This model achieved a R
2
 of about 46%, with all variables being 
statistically significant, except for dividend growth
13
. Following, the contemporaneous 
logarithmic SVI variable, accounting for the effect of retail investors’ attention, was 
included in the model. This variable as well as its quadratic term appeared to be 
statistical insignificant, indicating no relation between retail investor attention and 
volatility. Motivated by the work of Dimpfl and Jank (2012) who find Granger causality 
between investors’ attention and stock returns volatility in a dynamic relationship, lags 
of the SVI variable were added to the model up to the lag of 4
th
 order, covering 
approximately the previous 30 days for which volatility was registered. The resultant 
final equation is as follows: 
               ∑              ∑            
 
                                                                    (3) 
 Interestingly, as lags of SVI were added to the equation, the more recent SVI 
variables (except the contemporaneous) verified a gain in significance, with all lags 
being statistically significant at 1% confidence level in the final model, summarised in 
column (7) of Table 6. The correlation between SVI and volatility appears to be clearly 
positive, for instance when the SVI registered in previous week increases by 1%, there 
is, on average an increase of 0.0235% in volatility during the following week, holding 
all other things constant. Furthermore, the irrelevant contemporaneous relation indicates 
that there is a one week delay between the search in Google and the subsequent 
investment made by retail investors. 
                                                            
13 As dividend growth is a variable for which a lot of observations are missing and it is also a highly insignificant variable, in 
accordance with the principle of parsimony it was removed from the model. 
 These results
14
 provide strong evidence that a higher level of retail investor 
attention leads to increases in volatility, a fact that not only substantiates the preliminary 
hypothesis presented in the first subsection, but is also consistent with the augment of 
trading volume driven by a greater intensity of search queries for stock tickers in 
Google. In fact, the surge in trading volume verified when investors are more attentive 
to individual stocks appears as the main intermediary of this link between SVI and 
volatility, making it relevant to revisit the noise trading theme.  
 In accordance to Barber et al. (2009), retail investors trade impulsively upon 
noisy signals, disturbing security prices’ stability, introducing a higher level of risk, 
hereby translated into rise in idiosyncratic volatility. Hence, the findings for volatility 
gathered with the results obtained for liquidity, using SVI as a timely attention measure, 
support the consequences of noise trading at the individual asset level. 
 This result suggests that the inclusion of a time-effective measure of investors’ 
attention in models aiming to forecast stock returns volatility can improve their 
predictive power. Undoubtedly, an augmented estimating potential is always a good 
thing in itself, but the applicability of this result has its major value during bearish 
phases, periods not only characterised by high turbulence in the markets, when firms 
fundamental value is very often camouflaged, but also known as periods of especially 
high investor attention (see Andrei and Hasler (2012)). Consequently, the relation 
between retail investors’ attention and volatility is believed to be strengthened during 
downturns, with SVI explanatory power being boosted. 
 Regarding the work of Vlastakis and Markellos (2012), who extensively study 
the relation between information demand and stock market volatility in a sample of the 
30 largest NASDAQ stocks, this result corroborates their findings using a different 
                                                            
14 The results obtained for abnormal levels of investor attention are somehow in line with these findings for normal levels; 
nonetheless they can be misleading as they differ in terms of lags significance and coefficient direction for different constructions of  
the abnormal SVI variable. Therefore, considering them inconclusive, I do not present them. 
approach, a different and broader sample and also a different concept for the search 
terms of interest: stock tickers instead of companies’ names. 
 In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2007) posit that a good proxy for the difficulty 
of arbitrage of a stock is volatility of returns. Matching this result with Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) evidence, it is plausible to argue that, since more retail attention leads to 
higher volatility of stock returns, stocks which are often on the spotlight of retail 
investors, typically noise traders, are harder to arbitrage than stocks whose visibility is 
lower.  
 
V.4 Is retail investor attention a predictor of stock returns? 
Once the influence of retail investor attention on liquidity and volatility is 
determined, it interests a lot to assess whether investors’ attention, as measured by SVI, 
has some price impact on the individual stocks level.  
While Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2012) document surges in information 
demand around the specific event of earnings announcement, leading, on average to 
higher returns, Da et. al (2011), Joseph et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2013) among 
others, report a broader effect of investors’ attention, not specifically related to a 
particular event: when the volume of searches for stock tickers in Google and other 
search engines is abnormal in a certain week, on average, in the subsequent week 
abnormal positive returns are verified. This is where the true robustness test takes form 
as this is, intuitively, the less obvious effect of SVI.  
In that sense, the analysis starts by evaluating whether normal levels of investor 
attention should be taken into account in asset pricing. At this first stage, I initially 
implement the Carhart (1997) four-factor model through an inverse Fama-Macbeth 
regression, following the method of Da et al. (2011) and then it is extended with the 
inclusion of the logarithmical SVI as a risk factor. Besides the latter, the independent 
variables used are the weekly Fama-French factors and the stock returns earned in the 
previous week, as a proxy for momentum
15
, given that there is no weekly momentum 
factor available in the online research databases. 
The replicated four-factor model, whose dependent variable is excess return over 
the risk-free was fairly successful at explaining the returns of the 215 S&P500 stocks 
included in the sample, achieving a R
2
 of 45%. Following, the contemporaneous 
logarithmic form of SVI was included in the model as well as the respective quadratic 
term, but their coefficients turned out to be statistically insignificant. However, the 
documented interaction between investors’ attention and returns is rather dynamic. 
Thus, the linear and non-linear variables were added to the equation, being both 
statistically insignificant. Table 7 presents the empirical results. 
This first approach that intended to explore the predictive power of SVI on stock 
returns, from a broad asset pricing perspective, yielded no statistical evidence for a 
general relation between normal levels of SVI and risk adjusted returns.  
Yet, the hypothesis that even though usual levels of SVI do not exercise any 
explanatory power over excess stock returns, abnormal levels of retail investor attention 
are capable of leading abnormal returns, ought to be tested. Actually, this is the relation 
for which strong evidence is found in the aforementioned literature.  
To evaluate whether this interaction applies in this sample of stocks during the 
time period under analysis, again using an inverse Fama-Macbeth regression the four-
factor model was set up and abnormal investor attention variables were added to the 
specification. Being consistent with previous approach, first contemporaneous abnormal 
                                                            
15 Usually momentum takes under consideration a much larger time span, however, in this case, what interests is a very short-term 
effect on stock price, so I consider that it suffices to account for the past week return. In fact, this variable turned out to be always 
significant at a 1% confidence level. 
SVI, which turned out to be all statistical insignificant and, then, one-week lagged 
variables reaching the following final model:  
                                                                         (4)
 The output of this model is available in Table 8. Indeed, I find that abnormal 
levels of retail investor attention in the current week have a statistically and 
economically significant stock price effect in following week, even after the four-factor 
risk adjustment. The empirical evidence points out an exclusively linear relationship, 
which can be interpreted as follows: ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in abnormal SVI 
during a certain week leads to an average 0.0279% increase in the following week stock 
return, equivalent to a 1.46% rise in annual return. 
 This finding does not completely corroborate the results obtained by Da et al. 
(2011), who also find a negative non-linear relationship, suggesting that even though 
there is a linear augment in price, it decreases in magnitude after a certain point. 
Nevertheless, it is absolutely in line with the fundamental theory of attention-induced 
price pressure documented by Barber and Odean (2008), through which retail investors 
become net buyers of stocks that catch their attention, leading to a temporary increase in 
stock price, which takes place in the subsequent week. 
 Yet, when I assess the robustness of the results obtained, by using different 
metrics of abnormal SVI, either the difference between the current observations to a 
median over a longer period or to an average, or even to the whole sample median or 
average, I observe that the statistical significance is altered substantially. Table 9 
presents the results of this test, showing that the real existence of a positive and 
dynamic relation between abnormal levels of investor attention and abnormal returns 
depends on the way the abnormal SVI variable is constructed. Moreover, establishing a 
direct comparison to Da et al. (2011), who use the difference between each SVI 
observation and the median over the past 8 weeks, in this case there is still a positive 
linear interaction, though weakly significant: only at a 10% confidence level. 
 Summing up, first of all it is worth emphasising that the fact that the dynamic 
relationship between abnormal retail investor attention and abnormal stock returns, does 
not hold for all the abnormal SVI measures does not mean that it does not exist at all in 
general terms, it suggests that it may not be as strong and certain as other papers, which 
use the same measure for investor attention, report. Specifically, regarding the work of 
Da et al. (2011), I use a similar approach, but a different sample. In my case, the stocks 
under analysis are included in the main US market index, the S&P 500, an index with 
which various exchanges worldwide are correlated. Therefore, I would expect to see at 
least the same results holding in this case, provided that these are salient stocks, the US 
largest caps and the most meaningful firms, from an economical perspective. Another 
difference should be highlighted: Da et al. (2011) use DGTW returns, while I use 
Carhart four-factor model risk-adjusted returns. In what concerns the work of Joseph et 
al. (2012), I use the same sample, but with significantly less stocks, imposing a much 
stricter filter in order to eliminate as much noise as possible as well as invalid SVI 
observations, a fact that narrows down my sample to 215 stocks, and likely, I also use a 
different method, the more appropriate one according to Petersen (2005). Actually, 
Joseph et al. (2011) do not specify exactly which type of regressions and standard errors 
they use, they simply mention “run regressions” and “consistent with heteroskedasticity 
standard errors”. 
Finally, Barber et al. (2005) and Barber and Odean (2008) theories about noise 
trading and investor attention are not refuted or weakened. First, as Seasholes and Wu 
(2007) argue not all “attention-grabbing events lead to predictable behaviour”, so search 
intensity of stocks on Google may be one of those phenomena lacking a real predictive 
power and on top of that, it is not exactly an attention-grabbing event per se but a 
possible, however not necessary, consequence of one. SVI is rather a declaration of 
attention.   
 
V.5 Retail investor attention and anomalies: A short history of big failures 
In this field of special attractiveness to investors, Da et al. (2011) show that the 
increase in return that occurs in the week succeeding an outbreak in SVI is merely 
temporary, observing a price reversal after the second week, which is prolonged 
thereafter until the positive effect is more or less annulated, holding all other things 
constant. Since under specific circumstances I also found a statistically significant 
relationship between retail investor attention and stock returns, in order to go a step 
further, I assess whether investor attention may constitute a possible explanation to 
some other well-known market anomalies, such as the size anomaly, the value anomaly 
and momentum anomaly, or if, at least, investor attention somehow relates to firm-
specific features and firm-specific events.  
 This investigation faces some limitations. As it comes to size, the sample 
includes S&P 500 stocks, thus no small capitalisation firms can be found, however it is 
still possible to conduct the analysis in relative terms, determining within large caps 
which are bigger and which are smaller. Regarding value, as shown in the first 
subsection, the majority of the companies present an overvaluation, hence a markedly 
distinction between value and growth stocks is impossible. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to compare within overvalued BTM ratios, identifying which of them are more 
overvalued or and which are closer to equity’s book value. Finally, in the momentum 
examination, I consider only the previous week return as, investor attention fluctuates 
rapidly (see Da et al.(2011)) having only a very short-term effect and also due to the 
assumption that investors are timely attentive, therefore a declaration of attention, 
through a web search in Google, occurs soon after the attention-grabbing event. 
 To gauge a possible relation between retail investor attention, as measured by 
SVI, and firm-specific characteristics and events, two methods were put in place. The 
first, a simple intuitive analysis consisted in weekly sorting the stocks according to the 
aforementioned factors, forming quintiles and deciles portfolios.  
This naïve approach shown in Table 10 aimed at identifying possible patterns of 
SVI and returns across portfolios based on size, value and past returns. 
 In size portfolios, an upward trend in returns and in SVI seems to be present, 
however both are not monotonic, registering some significant breaks when deciles are 
analysed. If this relationship between retail investor attention and market capitalisation 
would exist, larger caps would perform smaller caps, contradicting any link between 
retail investor attention and the size anomaly. 
 Looking at portfolios based on BTM, no pattern is identifiable in SVI, whereas a   
downward trend is present in returns, as stocks’ market prices approach their book 
equity value. From this analysis, no strong connection can be established between retail 
investor attention and the value anomaly. Nevertheless, it is observable that the most 
overvalued stocks, registered both the highest returns and very high SVI levels.  
 Finally for momentum portfolios, there may be some extreme positive returns 
leading higher retail investor attention, consistent with Barber and Odean (2008) theory 
of attention-grabbing events; nonetheless, it appears that the best performers of one 
week become the worst performers in the following suggesting the presence of the price 
reversal in this sample, similar to what Da et al. (2011) find for the Russel 3000 stocks.  
 The second method to assess the existence of any relation between investor 
attention and firm-specific characteristics and events corresponds to a formal analysis, 
using a set of fixed-effect panel regressions and robust standard errors clustered by 
company, as a firm-effect seems to be present. I study the impact of investor attention 
on two different dependent variables: Jensen’s alpha from the Carhart model and 
Jensen’s alpha risk-adjusted for the market and individual stocks’ characteristics.
16
 The 
explanatory variables are: one week lagged abnormal SVI, the factor under analysis and 
an interaction variable of these two variables.  
 Table 11 shows that there is no relation between abnormal levels of investor 
attention and firm’s market capitalisation, given the fact that not even a single 
interaction variable turned out to be significant. 
 Table 12 reports the results for the value factor. Similarly to what happened with 
size, no link was found between retail investor attention and the Book-to-Market ratio. 
 Considering Table 13, despite weakly significant (only at a 10% confidence 
level) some interaction variables suggest a relation between retail investor attention and 
past returns. The negative coefficient associated to these variables indicates price 
reversals rather than persistency in returns after peaks of investor attention. 
 On the whole, this analysis whose goal was to find possible explanations for the 
size anomaly, the value anomaly and the momentum anomaly via retail investor 
attention, ended up being very conclusive: in this sample of stocks, SVI does not relate 
to any of the mentioned anomalies
17
. In contrast, there is some evidence supporting 
price reversals after the positive price pressure generated by boosts of search volume for 
stock tickers in Google. 
 
                                                            
16 Jensen’s alpha from the Carhart model was computed by calculating the difference between the realised return and the one 
estimated with the betas of the four-factor model from the previous subsection. Jensen’s alpha adjusted was estimated by computing 
the difference between the realised return and the return estimated using betas from a fixed-effect panel regression model with 
robust and clustered standard errors, whose explanatory variables were: market risk premium, firm’s market cap, firm’s BTM and 
firm’s past weekly return. 
17 A third method was also employed: weekly portfolios (quintiles) were formed on the basis of each factor under analysis, and for 
each of them I ran Fama-Macbeth regressions, risk-adjusting excess returns with the four-factor model plus an abnormal SVI 
variable. The results were in line with the ones reported, no significant relation between investor attention and firm-specific features 
was found.  
V.6 Impact of investors’ attention on the aggregate market level 
 Once the effects of retail investor attention on individual stocks are established, 
in this final subsection I investigate if any of the three previously studied market 
outcomes – liquidity, volatility and returns – correlates with retail investor attention at 
an aggregate market level. 
 In order to measure investors’ attention to the US stock market, volume of web 
search queries in Google was used. Naturally, the term
18
 which was assumed to reflect 
deliberate paying of attention by retail investors was S&P500, the true name of the 
market index. The period and the frequency under analysis remain the same: weekly 
frequency from January 2005 to December 2008. 
 An important remark ought to be made. Contrarily to what happens with 
individual stocks, investors do not own and trade the index itself, they can only trade 
either S&P500 index futures, an ETF replicating the index or invest in S&P500 index 
funds. Hence, there is no physical match between the security searched and the security 
traded, a fact that is likely to yield different results from the ones obtained thus far. 
 Maintaining the previous order, the first market outcome object of study was 
liquidity. Unlike the approach used for individual stocks, liquidity for S&P500 index is 
measured directly through volume traded, since there is no data for the total amount of 
shares outstanding for all the S&P500 stocks allowing the computation of share 
turnover ratio. Trading volume, in this case, corresponds to all the shares traded for all 
stocks included in the index, over a weekly time span.  
 The analysis of market trading volume was conducted using time-series robust 
regressions and the respective results are in Table 14. The first specification containing 
only the controls, closing price and previous weekly return, achieved a R
2
 of 56%. 
                                                            
18 The ticker for S&P 500 index – SPX – was not included to avoid ambiguities that may result from this search term, provided that 
there is a multinational company whose name is exactly SPX. 
Subsequently, the model was extended with the inclusion of linear and non-linear SVI 
variables, first the contemporaneous one and after that the lagged effect. I consider the 
results found as misleading for three reasons. First, none of the coefficients’ 
significance seems stable as more variables are added to the model; second, the 
significance of the linear variables is always inferior to 10%; and third, weirdly, not 
only the adjusted goodness of fit diminishes, penalising the inclusion of irrelevant 
variables, but also the normal R
2
 decreases. Therefore, I conclude that there is no 
evidence supporting a true interaction between normal levels of investor attention and 
market index volume traded. 
 Anyway, keeping consistency with what was previously done I examine a 
possible relationship between those two realities, at an abnormal level. The procedure 
followed was the exact same and the results are in Table 15. In this case, there is 
significant evidence supporting linear, contemporaneous and dynamic, links between 
abnormal investor attention and abnormal market liquidity. Numerically, a 1% increase 
in the current abnormal SVI leads to an average 3.17% rise in current abnormal volume 
traded, ceteris paribus; while 1% surge in abnormal SVI in the previous week makes 
the current week abnormal trading volume grow 2.9%, on average, holding all other 
things equal. A possible explanation I find for this finding relates to investors’ 
behaviour as follows: individual investors use Google to search the overall performance 
of the market, after acknowledging it, they look for the best performers, leading to the 
increase in individual stocks liquidity, which in turn, amplifies the overall liquidity of 
the market index. I estimated a quick panel regression with fixed-effect and robust 
clustered standard errors, without any controls, whose results are in line with this 
theory, displaying a positive and significant, though low, correlation between SVI  for 
individual stock ticker and the S&P500 term (Auxiliary Table 15.1). 
 Provided that retail investor attention affects the overall market liquidity, I study 
the existence of a possible relationship between retail investor attention and the 
volatility of market index returns.  
 Table 16 contains the results of the GARCH (1,1) model, which accounts for the 
exogenous SVI variables. I find consistency with the results for liquidity, as the 
contemporaneous SVI seems to affect volatility, leading to its increase in the subsequent 
period
19
. This relation is statistically significant at a 5% level. The economic 
explanation stems from the fact that, as it was showed for individual stocks, augments 
in liquidity prompted by peaks of investor attention come along with a rise in volatility. 
In line with this, are noise trading theories already explained throughout the paper.  
 Accordingly to the evidence provided by Andrei and Hasler (2012) stating that 
investors are more attentive during bearish phases, times which are also characterised 
by high volatility shocks; to ensure that the significance of the SVI coefficients is not 
only due to the crisis period included in the sample, I re-estimate the model excluding 
all the observations that occurred in the post-Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, on the 15
th
 
of September 2008, considered by many as the starting point to the financial crisis. As it 
is known, the collapse of this financial giant not only prompted a sharp fall in the equity 
market approximately until March 2009, throwing the S&P500 to values well below 
1000 points, but also increased dramatically the volatility of the US stock market. The 
results for this robustness re-estimation are available in column 11 and 12 of Table 16, 
and they show that, although slightly smaller, the influence of investor attention on 
market’s volatility persists even after excluding the crisis period. 
 Another meaningful relation can be studied from an overall market perspective: 
the correspondence between retail investors’ attention and implied volatility. 
                                                            
19 As mentioned in the data section, by using the most recent information, in this case contemporaneous, GARCH models yield a 
forecast of the variance of returns in the subsequent period. This is the reason why lagged SVI variables are insignificant in this 
model. 
 For that purpose, the VIX index
20
 is used as dependent variable, similarly to 
what was done by Vlastakis and Markellos (2012). To test this hypothesis, I implement 
a model that aims at explaining VIX weekly values via times-series robust regressions. 
Controlling for the only two possibly important factors (within this dataset) in the 
context of a forward looking volatility measure – interest rates and industrial production 
growth – SVI variables were included in the model. Table 17 provides strong evidence 
for the existence of a negative correlation between retail investors’ attention and implied 
volatility. This counter-intuitive result, for which I find no explanation, only holds when 
the crisis period is included in the sample, a fact that is even odder, provided that both 
variables peaked after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Excluding the crisis period from 
the sample, no relevant relations are found between retail investor attention and 
forward-looking volatility, suggesting that finance professionals do not account for the 
effects of noise trading in their previsions of market volatility, probably because, under 
normal circumstances, it has no significant impact on options implied volatility.   
 As a matter of fact, this paper does not succeed in extending the work of 
Vlastakis and Markellos (2012), who find a truly significant positive relationship 
between retail investors’ attention and individual stocks’ implied volatility, to the 
aggregate market level. 
 Finally, moving to the subject of returns, I assess whether the intensity of 
searches for the term S&P500 has a changing impact on the market index quote. 
 A set of robust time-series regression were again employed. In this case, there 
are almost no control variables to explain S&P500 weekly returns, provided that the 
Fama-French factors apply only to individual firms or portfolios, but not to the index. 
                                                            
20 The CBOE VIX index is a proxy for the following 30-days market volatility, grounded on the basis of market expectations, which 
in turn are derived mainly, but not exclusively, from supply and demand for call and put options on the S&P500 index. The VIX is a 
widely used measure of implied volatility which is also considered to be an “investor fear gauge”. 
Due to the same reason a further analysis of risk-adjusted (abnormal) returns could not 
be carried out. Nonetheless, it is still possible to control for the effect of momentum, by 
including a lagged variable of returns
21
. Interestingly, the final model in column 5 of 
Table 18 suggests that a 1% increase in SVI for S&P500 in a certain week predicts a 
higher index return in the following week, by an average value of 0.636% points, ceteris 
paribus. The same argument for liquidity holds as a possible reason for the price 
impact, allowing its polish: finding the best performers, retail investors take long 
positions on them (consistent with previous findings as well as Barber and Odean 
(2008) and Da et al. (2011)), generating the price pressure that drives up stock returns 
and consequently the market index value. Nevertheless, care must be taken when 
interpreting this result, since there are not many control variables in the model and this 
effect of SVI may be due to some other factors for which the model does not account.    
 In a nutshell, at the aggregate level, retail investor attention, as measured by SVI 
for S&P500, possesses some influence on market events for the market index. It 
interacts with liquidity, when abnormal levels of both dimensions are considered; in line 
with this, when investors are more attentive to the market its volatility tend to increase 
and, last but not least, higher levels of investor attention to the market index also result 
in a rise in market index quote, on average. Yet, it is relevant to look at these results  
with a critical eye and do not take them as absolutely certain, provided that few control 
variables were included in the models, due to the nature of the market index and also 
due to data limitations. Moreover, the relationships documented occur through indirect 
mechanisms as there is no physical match between the term searched and the asset 
traded, the impact on the market index occurs via individual stocks. 
 
                                                            
21 For the sake of rigour, I also specified that model accounting for past volatility, which is not often priced, however establishes a 
well-known negative correlation with stock returns. The significance of the lagged SVI variables remained unchanged. 
Investing without research is like playing stud poker and never looking at the cards.  
Peter Lynch  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 With the growing internet dominance over the gathering and subsequent 
spreading of information, financial markets have witnessed an amplified efficiency, 
while investors enjoy an abundance of information, which they explore in an attempt to 
become more knowledgeable about the widest variety of firms. 
 In this paper, I take search intensity for stock tickers in Google as a deliberate 
manifestation of attention from retail investors, the ones who use such tools to seek 
financial information, when an investment shows up in their short-term horizon. 
  Numerous recent studies defend that the search frequency in Google and in 
other web search engines exerts a significant influence on market outcomes for 
individual stocks. Having as target the development of a robustness test to see whether 
the documented results hold in the sample of the most salient and economic 
representative US stocks, I provide evidence that surges of individual investor attention 
during the current week predict higher stock liquidity and greater volatility in the 
upcoming week. As for the price impact, I disclose that its interaction with attention 
might not be as plain as it has been reported and I assert that a significant effect of the 
latter on the former depends heavily on what is considered an abnormal SVI level. 
Throughout these examinations, the conclusions reached are in line with theories of 
noise trading and investor attention. 
Beyond, I assess whether the link of web search volume with returns may relate 
to firm-specific characteristics, such as market capitalisation and Book-to-Market ratio, 
or to past returns. I observe that no relationship exists, except for a possible price 
reversal after the positive returns earned in the week that follows an SVI outbreak. 
I also extend the investigation to an aggregate market level, accomplishing the 
result that volume of searches in Google for the term S&P500 establishes a dynamic 
positive correlation with the overall market index liquidity, volatility and return. 
Taken all together, these findings deliver a broad picture of how retail investor 
attention, triggering noise trading, may affect the stock market in the short-run, 
enhancing our understanding of it. 
 In essence, search frequency in Google appears as a component of behavioural 
finance possessing a truly relevant impact on short-term market activity. Yet, its 
possible asymmetric effects as well as the markets on which it exercises some action, or 
even the relations it establishes with some phenomena, such as news from concrete 
nature, some specific market events or short-selling, are still lacking clarification and 




Table 1 – This table displays the SVI descriptive statistics for the five weekly portfolios formed 




            
SVI 
Quintiles 







 SVI  
Maximum 
SVI 
            
0 8,926 4.5 3.51 0 6.04 
1 8,692 6.67 6.61 6.05 6.90 
2 9,099 7.07 7.07 6.91 7.27 
3 8,991 7.72 7.80 7.28 8.64 
4 8,973 10.59 1.64 8.65 377.50 
            
 
Table 2 – This table contains the statistics for market events and firm-specific features for five weekly portfolios formed on the basis of SVI.
                  
Median                 
SVI 












 Returnt-1 (%) 
                  
0 10,886,219 .0262 24.805 .06 9864.1553 .3038 17 .11 
1 11,184,378 .0277 24.902 .09 1182.1329 .3547 15 .04 
2 11,284,496 .0281 24.790 .12 1136.4693 .3661 15 .08 
3 10,960,400 .0292 25.060 .12 1201.887 .3295 15 .18 
4 19,471,100 .0360 28.216 .05 1883.8795 .3294 16 .07 
                  
Average                 
SVI 
quintiles  Trading Volume   Turnover 
 Volatility 30 
days 
Weekly  








Return t-1 (%) 
                  
0 21,667,394 .0412 31.068 -.07 21670.343 .3574 23.708 .02 
1 22,169,613 .0406 31.615 -.06 26047.091 .4367 18.621 -.15 
2 21,345,907 .0430 32.401 -.09 25710.733 .4552 18.266 -.11 
3 23,179,164 .0435 31.955 -.04 24362.124 .4065 18.903 .01 
4 50,522,672 .0565 36.054 -.32 51415.824 .3928 23.952 -.30 
                  
                  
Table 3 – This table reports the results from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is share turnover ratio (in decimal form). The independent variables are adjusted 
closing price and market capitalization (both in log form), logarithmical past returns over the 
past 4 weeks and linear and quadratic SVI variables in log form, both contemporaneous and 
lagged. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ 
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover 
Explanatory variables             
              
logStock_Price 0.0107 0.00927 0.00944 0.00905 0.00913 0.00877 
  (0.00856) (0.00862) (0.00869) (0.00855) (0.00858) (0.00864) 
logMkt_Cap -0.0223*** -0.0244*** -0.0245*** -0.0238*** -0.0238*** -0.0245*** 
  (0.00661) (0.00662) (0.00666) (0.00654) (0.00654) (0.00661) 
pastret1 -0.0965*** -0.0920*** -0.0920*** -0.0922*** -0.0922*** -0.0914*** 
  (0.00788) (0.00792) (0.00792) (0.00791) (0.00790) (0.00792) 
pastret2 -0.0831*** -0.0779*** -0.0779*** -0.0787*** -0.0787*** -0.0783*** 
  (0.00713) (0.00736) (0.00735) (0.00731) (0.00731) (0.00729) 
pastret3 -0.0809*** -0.0750*** -0.0749*** -0.0776*** -0.0776*** -0.0758*** 
  (0.00750) (0.00776) (0.00774) (0.00754) (0.00752) (0.00759) 
pastret4 -0.0929*** -0.0875*** -0.0874*** -0.0896*** -0.0896*** -0.0872*** 
  (0.00770) (0.00803) (0.00801) (0.00784) (0.00782) (0.00808) 
logSVI   0.0150*** 0.0108     -0.00805 
    (0.00309) (0.00813)     (0.00945) 
logSVI_squared     0.000944     0.00764* 
      (0.00237)     (0.00509) 
logSVIlag1       0.00887*** 0.0698** 0.0230*** 
        (0.00221) (0.00314) (0.00598) 
logSVIlag1_sq         -0.00429*** -0.00768*** 
          (0.00178) (0.00196) 
Constant 0.220*** 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.217*** 
  (0.0433) (0.0432) (0.0436) (0.0427) (0.0424) (0.0433) 
              
Observations 43,606 41,532 41,532 41,489 41,489 41,108 
R-squared 0.107 0.128 0.128 0.121 0.121 0.136 
Number of cid 215 215 215 215 215 215 





















Table 4 – This table reports the results from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is abnormal share turnover ratio (in decimal form). The independent variables are 
adjusted closing price and market capitalization (both in log form); logarithmical past returns 
over the past 4 weeks; a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when BTM is below 0.35 and 0 
otherwise; and linear and quadratic abnormal SVI variables in log form, both 
contemporaneous and lagged. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in 
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
            












Explanatory variables           
            
logPX_LAST -0.0157 -0.0159 -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0166 
  (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0124) 
logCUR_MKT_ 0.0212** 0.0212** 0.0216** 0.0216** 0.0210** 
  (0.00969) (0.00965) (0.00961) (0.00956) (0.00965) 
pastret1 -0.0841*** -0.0840*** -0.0833*** -0.0832*** -0.0826*** 
  (0.00795) (0.00793) (0.00794) (0.00793) (0.00795) 
pastret2 -0.0679*** -0.0679*** -0.0681*** -0.0679*** -0.0678*** 
  (0.00662) (0.00663) (0.00660) (0.00661) (0.00663) 
pastret3 -0.0615*** -0.0614*** -0.0630*** -0.0630*** -0.0624*** 
  (0.00658) (0.00658) (0.00642) (0.00642) (0.00648) 
pastret4 -0.0741*** -0.0739*** -0.0753*** -0.0752*** -0.0734*** 
  (0.00698) (0.00697) (0.00681) (0.00681) (0.00708) 
BTM 0.0390*** 0.0389*** 0.0390*** 0.0388*** 0.0384*** 
  (0.00679) (0.00677) (0.00677) (0.00676) (0.00676) 
Abn_SVI 0.0285*** 0.0320***     0.00132 
  (0.00617) (0.00500)     (0.00216) 
Abn_SVI_squared   -0.00998**     -0.0189* 
    (0.00590)     (0.0131) 
Abn_SVIlag     0.00472* 0.00929*** 0.0445*** 
      (0.00245) (0.00234) (0.00770) 
Abn_SVIlag_squared       -0.0128*** -0.0188*** 
        (0.00409) (0.00385) 
Constant -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.157*** 
  (0.0580) (0.0578) (0.0575) (0.0572) (0.0577) 
            
Observations 41,071 41,071 41,028 41,028 40,647 
R-squared 0.167 0.167 0.165 0.166 0.174 
Number of cid 213 213 213 213 213 












Table 5 – This table presents the results of the estimation of a GARCH (1,1) model, extended 
by the addition of exogenous SVI variables, contemporaneous and lagged in log-form. The 
conditional variance estimated corresponds to the conditional variance of logarithmical weekly 
returns. L.arch and L.garch denote the coefficients for the most recent squared residual and the 
most recent variance, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The coefficients of Arch and Garch components add up to values higher than 1, thus the 















              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable RETURN ARCH RETURN ARCH RETURN ARCH 
Explanatory Variables             
              
L.arch   0.127***   0.141***   0.142*** 
    (0.00130)   (0.00142)   (0.00142) 
L.garch   0.894***   0.881***   0.881*** 
    (0.00111)   (0.00120)   (0.00121) 
logSVI     -0.000241       
      (0.000420)       
logSVIlag1         0.000527**   
          (0.000301)   
Constant 0.00198*** 1.57e-05*** 0.00247*** 2.06e-05*** 0.000949 2.08e-05*** 
  (0.000158) (8.12e-07) (0.000868) (9.69e-07) (0.000879) (9.75e-07) 
              
Observations 44,466 44,466 42,202 42,202 42,152 42,152 
 
 
Auxiliary Table 5.1 – This table reports the results from an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
made to weekly log-returns. The null hypothesis of unit root and therefore non-stationarity is 
rejected when p-value is higher than 0.05. 
 
        
Fisher-type unit-root test for RETURN     
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests     
--------------------------------------     
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                        Number of panels       =    215 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary                   Avg. number of periods = 206.82 
          ADF regressions: 10 lags 
        
    Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(430) P 3370.9130 0.0000 
Inverse normal Z -47.7359 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(1079) L* -63.3129 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 100.2843 0.0000 
        
 
Auxiliary Table 5.2 – This table reports the results from an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
made to logarithmical SVI. The null hypothesis of unit root and therefore non-stationarity is 
rejected when p-value is higher than 0.05. 
 
        
Fisher-type unit-root test for logSVI     
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests     
--------------------------------------     
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                        Number of panels       =    215 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary                   Avg. number of periods = 197.04 
          ADF regressions: 10 lags 
        
    Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(430) P 39.311.170 0.0000 
Inverse normal Z -403.568 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(1074) L* -705.704 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 1.193.871 0.0000 














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable VOL_30d VOL_30d VOL_30d VOL_30d VOL_30d VOL_30d VOL_30d 
Explanatory Variables               
                
logVolume_traded 0.190*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 
  (0.0160) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
pastret1 -0.219*** -0.196*** -0.196*** -0.195*** -0.199*** -0.197*** -0.199*** 
  (0.0631) (0.0478) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0485) (0.0492) (0.0495) 
lagVIX_Return -0.0822*** -0.0880*** -0.0881*** -0.0863*** -0.0873*** -0.0847*** -0.0884*** 
  (0.00715) (0.00641) (0.00635) (0.00657) (0.00661) (0.00669) (0.00680) 
RF -3.115*** -3.229*** -3.226*** -3.232*** -3.234*** -3.265*** -3.311*** 
  (0.106) (0.0949) (0.0951) (0.0956) (0.0961) (0.0974) (0.0985) 
INDUSTRI -1.985*** -1.954*** -1.953*** -1.926*** -1.919*** -1.852*** -1.751*** 
  (0.206) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177) 
DIV_GR_1Y 9.29e-08             
  (1.38e-06)             
logSVI   0.0262*** -0.00610 -0.00205 -0.00297 -0.00386 -0.00444 
    (0.0117) (0.0202) (0.00908) (0.00890) (0.00890) (0.00908) 
logSVI_squared     0.00505         
      (0.00611)         
logSVIlag1       0.0530*** 0.0255*** 0.0265*** 0.0233*** 
        (0.00981) (0.00715) (0.00690) (0.00678) 
logSVIlag2         0.0489*** 0.0303*** 0.0334*** 
          (0.00801) (0.00705) (0.00715) 
logSVIlag3           0.0341*** 0.0164*** 
            (0.00572) (0.00526) 
logSVIlag4             0.0276*** 
              (0.00528) 
                
Constant -2.569*** -2.403*** -2.379*** -2.443*** -2.466*** -2.468*** -2.465*** 
  (0.260) (0.228) (0.223) (0.234) (0.238) (0.242) (0.244) 
                
Observations 34,113 42,036 42,036 41,594 41,339 40,985 40,657 
R-squared 0.465 0.450 0.450 0.453 0.454 0.456 0.459 
Number of cid 173 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464 0.450 0.450 0.453 0.454 0.456 0.458 
 
 
Table 6 – This table reports the results from a fixed-effect panel regression. The dependent 
variable is volatility of individual stock returns over the past 30 days (in decimal form). The 
independent variables are volume traded in log form; 1-week lag log stock return; 1-week lag log-
return for the VIX index; quarterly industrial production growth; the return on the risk-free asset; 
a Bloomberg estimate of the 1-year dividend growth, and five SVI variables accounting for the 
search intensity registered over the current week and the previous four. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are presented in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 




Table 7 – This table contains the results from inverse Fama-Macbeth regressions. The 
dependent variable is weekly excess return over the risk-free (in decimal form). The 
independent variables are the weekly Fama-French factors; the 1-week lag log-return; and linear 
and quadratic variables of logarithmical SVI, both contemporaneous and lagged one week. 
Fama-Macbeth standard errors adjusted for a possible time-effect in the residuals are in 
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(Fama-Macbeth regression does not provide Adjusted R-squared.) 
 







  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn 
Explanatory Variables             
              
MktRF 1.117*** 1.113*** 1.111*** 1.117*** 1.118*** 1.111*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0299) 
SMB 0.0924** 0.0997** 0.104** 0.0790* 0.0797* 0.0924* 
  (0.0454) (0.0470) (0.0467) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0477) 
HML 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.153*** 
  (0.0490) (0.0502) (0.0498) (0.0502) (0.0498) (0.0503) 
pastret1 0.0349*** 0.0354*** 0.0357*** 0.0348*** 0.0340*** 0.0343*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0117) 
logSVI   -0.260 9.756     7.875 
    (0.229) (11.62)     (13.89) 
logSVI_squared     -2.476     -2.183 
      (2.987)     (3.493) 
logSVIlag1       -0.103 -10.19 4.351 
        (0.235) (13.04) (19.87) 
logSVIlag1_squared         2.671 -1.100 
          (3.339) (5.106) 
Constant 
-
0.0599*** 0.532 -9.597 0.176 9.751 -11.27 
  (0.0225) (0.455) (11.31) (0.461) (12.74) (23.44) 
              
Observations 44,220 41,956 41,956 41,956 41,956 40,166 
R-squared 0.452 0.461 0.466 0.462 0.465 0.478 




Table 8 – This table contains the results from inverse Fama-Macbeth regressions. The 
dependent variable is weekly excess return over the risk-free (in decimal form). The 
independent variables are the weekly Fama-French factors; the 1-week lag log-return; and linear 
and quadratic variables of logarithmical abnormal SVI, both contemporaneous and lagged one 
week. Fama-Macbeth standard errors adjusted for a possible time-effect in the residuals are in 
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn 
Explanatory Variables         
          
MktRF 1.118*** 1.119*** 1.118*** 1.118*** 
  (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
SMB 0.101** 0.101** 0.0771 0.0759 
  (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0469) 
HML 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 
  (0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0503) (0.0498) 
pastret_1 0.0362*** 0.0355*** 0.0359*** 0.0351*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Abn_SVI -0.00754 -0.00893     
  (0.00892) (0.00881)     
Abn_SVI_squared   0.164     
    (0.251)     
Abn_SVIlag     0.0193** 0.0279*** 
      (0.00876) (0.00979) 
Abn_SVIlag_squared       -0.324 
        (0.274) 
Constant -0.000664*** -0.000658*** -0.000760*** -0.000656** 
  (0.000219) (0.000219) (0.000248) (0.000272) 
          
Observations 41,630 41,630 41,630 41,630 
R-squared 0.465 0.468 0.463 0.466 




Table 9 – This table contains the results from the robustness test made to the impact of abnormal SVI on individual stock returns. This test was performed 
through inverse Fama-Macbeth regressions. The dependent variable is weekly excess return over the risk-free (in decimal form). The independent variables 
are the weekly Fama-French factors; the 1-week lag log-return; and linear and quadratic variables of logarithmical abnormal SVI registered in the previous 
week. The abnormal levels of SVI were computed as the difference between each log-SVI observation and the log-median (m) or the log-average (a) of the 
SVI registered during the 4, 6 and 8 previous weeks. “variationsinsvi” represents the logarithmical weekly variations in SVI.  Fama-Macbeth standard errors 
adjusted for a possible time-effect in the residuals are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (Fama-
Macbeth regression does not provide Adjusted R-squared.)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dependent Variable ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn ExReturn   
Explanatory Variables                   
                    
MktRF 1.118*** 1.118*** 1.117*** 1.118*** 1.117*** 1.119*** 1.118*** 1.115***   
  (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0298)   
SMB 0.0752 0.0767 0.0794* 0.0781* 0.0803* 0.0823* 0.0797* 0.0741   
  (0.0468) (0.0469) (0.0468) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0478)   
HML 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.133***   
  (0.0498) (0.0500) (0.0503) (0.0500) (0.0503) (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0504)   
pastret_1 0.0347*** 0.0359*** 0.0372*** 0.0362*** 0.0375*** 0.0336*** 0.0340*** 0.0367***   
  (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0114)   
lagabn_svi_a4 0.0250**                 
  (0.0101)                 
lagabn_svi_a4_sq -0.475                 
  (0.365)                 
lagabn_svi_a6   0.0154*               
    (0.00863)               
lagabn_svi_a6_sq   -0.431               
    (0.304)               
lagabn_svi_a8     0.0115             
      (0.00861)             
lagabn_svi_a8_sq     -0.245             
      (0.255)             
lagabn_svi_m6       0.0211**           
        (0.00907)           
lagabn_svi_m6_sq       -0.357           
        (0.240)           
lagabn_svi_m8         0.0153*         
          (0.00876)         
lagabn_svi_m8_sq         -0.164         
          (0.207)         
lagabn_svi_median           -0.00145       
            (0.00604)       
lagabn_svi_median_sq           0.142       
            (0.178)       
lagabn_svi_average             0.000574     
              (0.00568)     
lagabn_svi_average_sq             0.142     
              (0.177)     
Lagvariationsinsvi               0.00523   
                (0.00331)   
lagvariationsinsvi_sq               -0.0372   
                (0.0310)   




0.000862*** -0.000686**   
  (0.000276) (0.000279) (0.000276) (0.000268) (0.000265) (0.000616) (0.000306) (0.000281)   
                    
Observations 41,630 41,294 40,953 41,294 40,953 41,857 41,956 41,506   
R-squared 0.466 0.467 0.468 0.467 0.468 0.465 0.465 0.466   
Number of groups 214 214 214 214 214 213 214 214   
   





Table 10 – This table documents the naïve approach to the analysis of a relation between firm-specific characteristics (size and value) or events (past return), 
SVI and returns. This table contains the SVI levels and returns for each of the five and ten weekly portfolios formed on the basis of (1) market capitalization, 
(2) Book-to-Market ratio and (3) past returns. 
                              
Size Quintiles       Value Quintiles       Momentum Quintiles       






















(%) SVI SVI 
                              
0 -.09 -.63 6.97 7.09 0 .27 .4 7.07 9.02 0 .28 -.31 7.1 9.13 
1 .11 -.1 7.06 7.22 1 .2 .16 7.09 7.68 1 .39 .26 7.06 7.8 
2 .11 -.07 7.02 7 2 .11 .04 7.08 7.99 2 .18 .09 7.04 7.8 
3 .16 .07 7.1 7.54 3 .13 -.12 7.09 8.93 3 -.01 -.09 7.06 8.13 
4 .15 .05 7.32 12.59 4 -.32 -1.10 7.05 7.94 4 -.4 -.65 7.11 8.73 
                              
                              
Size Deciles       Value Deciles       Momentum Deciles       






















(%) SVI SVI 
                              
0 -.24 -.93 7.03 7.64 0 .32 .41 7.04 9.42 0 .02 -.78 7.12 9.28 
1 0 -.33 6.92 6.55 1 .22 .3 7.09 8.62 1 .43 .16 7.09 8.99 
2 .09 -.1 7.09 7.09 2 .13 .09 7.15 7.77 2 .43 .29 7.06 7.7 
3 .12 -.09 7.03 7.36 3 .26 .22 7.04 7.59 3 .35 .24 7.06 7.9 
4 .08 -.06 6.95 6.87 4 .1 .03 7.07 8.05 4 .18 .14 7.02 7.79 
5 .14 -.08 7.09 7.13 5 .12 .04 7.09 7.92 5 .18 .05 7.06 7.81 
6 .13 .06 7.08 7.63 6 .18 .02 7.1 8.6 6 0 -.03 7.04 8.23 
7 .17 .09 7.14 7.45 7 .09 -.25 7.09 9.26 7 -.03 -.15 7.08 8.03 
8 .23 .07 7.11 8.53 8 -.025 -.31 7.05 8.25 8 -.26 -.26 7.1 8.48 
9 .1 .03 8.3 16.66 9 -.72 -1.89 7.05 7.62 9 -.62 -1.05 7.12 8.99 
                              
Table 11 – This table presents the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. The dependent variables are Jensen’s Alphas (in decimal form)calculated as the 
difference between the actual realized returns and the ones estimated by the Carhart model and a model that risk-adjusts stocks for the market and their 
specific characteristics (market cap, BTM and weekly past returns). The independent variables are market capitalization (in log form); different abnormal SVI 
variables, comparing each observation to the median over the 4, 6 and 8 weeks; and interaction variables between market capitalization and abnormal SVI. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 







Carhart Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures 
Expalanatory Variables             
              
lnMKTcap 0.0159*** 0.0162*** 0.0164*** 0.00223** 0.00217* 0.00216* 
  (0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00114) 
lagabn_svi_m4 -0.0132     0.0681**     
  (0.0064)     (0.0429)     
SVIm4_SIZE 0.00321     -0.00656     
  (0.00790)     (0.00603)     
lagabn_svi_m6   -0.0138     0.0445   
    (0.0574)     (0.0439)   
SVIm6_SIZE   0.00306     -0.00427   
    (0.00682)     (0.00421)   
lagabn_svi_m8     -0.0185     0.0346 
      (0.0504)     (0.0406) 
SVIm8_SIZE     0.00352     -0.00325 
      (0.00594)     (0.00388) 
Constant -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.156*** -0.0198* -0.0191* -0.0191* 
  (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
              
Observations 41,661 41,321 40,976 41,203 40,867 40,526 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Number of cid 215 215 215 215 215 215 
 
 
Table 12 – This table presents the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. The dependent variables are Jensen’s Alphas (in decimal form)calculated as the 
difference between the actual realized returns and the ones estimated by the Carhart model and a model that risk-adjusts stocks for the market and their 
specific characteristics (market cap, BTM and weekly past returns). The independent variables are Book-to-Market ratio; different abnormal SVI variables, 
comparing each observation to the median over the 4, 6 and 8 weeks; and interaction variables between Book-to-Market ratio and abnormal SVI. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Alpha_Carhart Alpha_Carhart Alpha_Carhart Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures 
Expalanatory Variables             
              
BTM -0.0239*** -0.0239*** -0.0239*** 0.000785 0.000730 0.000746 
  (0.00343) (0.00344) (0.00343) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00180) 
lagabn_svi_m4 0.0550*     0.00417     
  (0.0331)     (0.00469)     
SVI_VALUE1 0.0298     -0.000374     
  (0.0339)     (0.00507)     
lagabn_svi_m6   0.0487**     0.00621*   
    (0.0283)     (0.00352)   
SVI_VALUE2   0.0263     0.00242   
    (0.0292)     (0.00361)   
lagabn_svi_m8     0.0463     0.00625 
      (0.0432)     (0.00382) 
SVI_VALUE3     0.0245     0.00244 
      (0.0260)     (0.00367) 
Constant 0.00932*** 0.00930*** 0.00930*** 0.00105 0.00115 0.00117 
  (0.00144) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.000755) (0.000755) (0.000758) 
              
Observations 41,077 40,741 40,400 41,072 40,736 40,395 
R-squared 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of cid 215 215 215 215 215 215 
             
Table 13 – This table presents the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. The dependent variables are Jensen’s Alphas (in decimal form)calculated as the 
difference between the actual realized returns and the ones estimated by the Carhart model and a model that risk-adjusts stocks for the market and their 
specific characteristics (market cap, BTM and weekly past returns). The independent variables are 1-week lagged log-returns; different abnormal SVI 
variables, comparing each observation to the median over the 4, 6 and 8 weeks; and interaction variables between 1-week lagged log-returns and abnormal 
SVI. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Alpha_Carhart Alpha_Carhart Alpha_Carhart Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures Alpha_StockFeatures 
Expalanatory Variables             
              
pastret1 -0.0172 -0.0166 -0.0164 0.0203** 0.0206** 0.0201** 
  (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0158) (0.00908) (0.00921) (0.00924) 
lagabn_svi_m4 0.0139**     0.00477     
  (0.00644)     (0.00547)     
SVI_MOM1 -1.458*     -0.00325     
  (0.805)     (0.0174)     
lagabn_svi_m6   0.0137**     0.00301   
    (0.00629)     (0.00378)   
SVI_MOM2   -1.409*     -0.0186   
    (0.773)     (0.0164)   
lagabn_svi_m8     0.0139**     0.00297 
      (0.00597)     (0.00352) 
SVI_MOM3     -1.344*     -0.00614 
      (0.768)     (0.0142) 
Constant -0.000834*** -0.000864*** -0.000874*** 0.00142*** 0.00149*** 0.00152*** 
  (6.33e-05) (5.74e-05) (6.19e-05) (2.64e-05) (2.59e-05) (2.82e-05) 
              
Observations 41,661 41,321 40,976 41,203 40,867 40,526 
R-squared 0.074 0.075 0.071 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Number of cid 215 215 215 215 215 215 
             
 
Table 14 – This table documents the results for time-series robust regressions. The dependent variable is logarithmical weekly trading volume. The 
independent variables are weekly closing index quote (in log form); the log-return obtained by the S&P 500 market index in the previous week; and linear and 
quadratic log-SVI variables, both contemporaneous and 1-week lagged. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Dependent Variable logVolume logVolume logVolume logVolume logVolume 
   Explanatory Variables           
            
logSP_closePrice 2.178*** 0.809*** 2.108*** 1.954*** 2.007*** 
  (0.148) (0.216) (0.175) (0.185) (0.197) 
pastret1 -6.166*** -7.616*** -5.122*** -5.204*** -3.844*** 
  (0.672) (0.879) (0.733) (0.741) (0.788) 
logSVI   -0.656 -7.97* -15.11* -10.96* 
    (0.587) (4.570) (8.591) (6.175) 
logSVI_sq     5.442** 5.258 3.800 
      (3.410) (3.414) (2.625) 
logSVIlag       -0.581** -7.36* 
        (0.275) (4.349) 
logSVIlag_sq         7.20* 
          (4.221) 
Constant 6.022*** 16.97*** 21.32*** 22.47*** 44.49*** 
  (1.058) (1.804) (3.594) (3.633) (4.248) 
            
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 
R-squared 0.560 0.311 0.546 0.554 0.497 
Adjusted R-squared 0.556 0.301 0.537 0.543 0.482 
           
 
 
Table 15 – This table documents the results for time-series robust regressions. The dependent 
variable is logarithmical weekly abnormal trading volume. The independent variables are weekly 
closing index quote (in log form); the log-return obtained by the S&P 500 market index in the 
previous week; and linear and quadratic abnormal SVI variables, both contemporaneous and 1-
week lagged. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Auxiliary Table 15.1 – This table presents the results for a fixed-effect panel regression.  The 
dependent variable is the weekly SVI for each stock ticker included in the sample. The 
independent variable is the weekly SVI for the term S&P500. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 










Explanatory Variables         
          
logSP_closePrice -3.511*** -3.733*** -3.653*** -3.825*** 
  (0.538) (0.546) (0.553) (0.573) 
pastret1 -2.456 -3.295 -3.244 -3.204 
  (2.496) (2.507) (2.528) (2.542) 
Abn_SVI 2.998** 4.041*** 3.338** 3.168** 
  (1.292) (1.381) (1.492) (1.500) 
Abn_SVI_sq   -17.68* -16.49 -16.03 
    (10.49) (10.58) (10.65) 
lagAbn_SVI     1.633 2.891** 
      (1.348) (1.470) 
lagAbn_SVI_sq       -13.78 
        (11.65) 
Constant 45.98*** 47.66*** 47.06*** 48.35*** 
  (3.869) (3.938) (3.993) (4.147) 
          
Observations 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.357 0.379 0.382 0.392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.337 0.354 0.350 0.354 
         
         
  (1) 
Dependent Variable SVI_stocks 
Explanatory Variables   
    
SVI_sp500 0.0104** 
  (0.00436) 
Constant 8.734*** 
  (0.185) 
    
Observations 44,681 
Number of cid 215 
R-squared 0.002 
   
Table 16 - This table presents the results of the estimation of a GARCH (1,1) model, extended by the addition of exogenous SVI variables, contemporaneous 
and lagged in log-form. The conditional variance estimated corresponds to the conditional variance of logarithmical weekly returns earned by the S&P 500 
index. L.arch and L.garch denote the coefficients for the most recent squared residual and the most recent variance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
The signal # indicates the models that were estimated excluding from the sample the period after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, therefore, in these cases, the 
last observation included occurred on 12/09/2008. 
 
 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)# (12)# 
Dependent Variable SP_Return ARCH SP_Return ARCH SP_Return ARCH SP_Return ARCH SP_Return ARCH SP_Return ARCH 
Explanatory Variables                         
                          
L.arch   0.339***   0.342***   0.354***   0.359***   0.353***   0.268*** 
    (0.0587)   (0.0575)   (0.0647)   (0.0739)   (0.0785)   (0.0834) 
L.garch   0.581***   0.570***   0.570***   0.565***   0.570***   0.710*** 
    (0.115)   (0.119)   (0.114)   (0.118)   (0.121)   (0.127) 
logSVI     0.0138   0.825**   0.842**   0.965**   0.712**   
      (0.0139)   (0.375)   (0.408)   (0.486)   (0.378)   
logSVI_sq         -0.251**   -0.256**   -0.294**   -0.232*   
          (0.117)   (0.126)   (0.150)   (0.166)   
logSVIlag             -0.00226   -0.355   -0.425   
              (0.0164)   (0.537)   (0.756)   
logSVIlag_sq                 0.109   0.203   
                  (0.166)   (0.381)   
Constant 0.00132 6.19e-05* -0.0210 6.45e-05* -0.674** 5.96e-05* -0.685** 6.06e-05* -0.499 5.95e-05* -0.987 6.38e-05* 
  (0.00138) (3.50e-05) (0.0224) (3.67e-05) (0.300) (3.19e-05) (0.319) (3.26e-05) (0.390) (3.25e-05) (0.677) (3.64e-05) 
                          
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 207 207 207 207 207 207 
 
 
Table 17 – This table presents the results from time-series robust regressions. The dependent variable is the weekly value of the VIX index (in log form). The 
independent variable are the return earned by the risk-free asset, quarterly industrial production growth; and linear and quadratic logarithmical SVI variables, 
both contemporaneous and1-week lagged. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
The signal # indicates the models that were estimated excluding from the sample the period after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, therefore, in these cases, the 
last observation included occurred on 12/09/2008. 
 














Explanatory Variables             
              
RF -5.874*** -5.846*** -6.701*** -6.873*** -6.565*** -6.045*** 
  (0.843) (0.894) (1.013) (1.032) (1.042) (0.852) 
INDUSTRI -14.67*** -13.76*** -10.87*** -10.45*** -9.928*** -3.534 
  (2.580) (2.654) (2.908) (2.920) (2.911) (3.005) 
logSVI   -0.471* -22.57*** -21.71*** -14.88** 5.146 
    (0.253) (5.447) (5.442) (5.900) (6.898) 
logSVI_sq     6.992*** 6.760*** 4.611** -1.770 
      (1.671) (1.666) (1.808) (2.145) 
logSVIlag       -0.220 -21.04*** -3.150 
        (0.338) (5.932) (6.892) 
logSVIlag_sq         6.508*** 0.700 
          (1.818) (2.145) 
Constant 3.184*** 3.934*** 21.43*** 21.01*** 32.19*** 2.720 
  (0.0659) (0.441) (4.420) (4.405) (5.272) (6.647) 
              
Observations 208 208 208 207 207 192 
R-squared 0.393 0.392 0.441 0.443 0.484 0.346 





Table 18 – This table documents the results for time-series robust regressions. The dependent variable is logarithmical weekly returns (in decimal form) 
earned by the S&P 500 index. The independent variables are the log-return obtained by the S&P 500 market index in the previous week; and the linear 
and quadratic abnormal SVI variables, both contemporaneous and 1-week lagged. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗ represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable SP_Return SP_Return SP_Return SP_Return SP_Return 
Explanatory Variables           
            
pastret1 -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.223*** -0.276*** -0.268*** 
  (0.0467) (0.0473) (0.0544) (0.0503) (0.0513) 
logSVI   -0.00314 1.160*** 0.513* 0.192 
    (0.0136) (0.358) (0.297) (0.341) 
logSVI_sq     -0.364*** -0.164* -0.0642 
      (0.111) (0.0914) (0.105) 
logSVIlag       0.0238 0.913*** 
        (0.0177) (0.317) 
logSVIlag_sq         -0.277*** 
          (0.0972) 
Constant 0.00107 0.00611 -0.920*** -0.437* -0.892*** 
  (0.00125) (0.0221) (0.290) (0.243) (0.275) 
            
Observations 206 206 205 206 206 
R-squared 0.101 0.102 0.123 0.133 0.171 
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